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Chapter Four 
Open Economies and Patterns of Trade  
(with Maria Ángela Parra) 
 
 This chapter takes up the relationship between foreign trade and growth in 
developing countries in the latter part of the twentieth century. Regional diversity 
was again the rule, with changing patterns of trade accompanying structural 
transformation. Fast-growing regions generally recorded increases in shares of 
manufactured exports with mid and high technological content, the most 
impressive being the Tigers and, in its speed of transformation, China. Recently 
in some countries, economic growth has been associated with specialization in 
dynamic services such as information and communications technologies, with 
India standing out in this regard. In the slow-growing regions on the other hand, 
trade diversification and technological upgrading were far less evident. The slow 
growers were also subject to terms-of-trade and other external shocks. 
For orthodox economists, openness to trade is an important explanatory 
factor for economic growth. Higher growth rates are supposed to be spurred by 
“gains from trade” due to access to lower-cost foreign products and more efficient 
domestic resource allocation on the supply side. True to their mercantilist 
heritage, structuralists point out that exports can stimulate domestic production 
through the multiplier. Also, as discussed in Chapter 1, access to foreign 
exchange from exports can be used to import necessary products to satisfy 
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demand. Imported foreign technology can lead to better and more productive 
investment which taps potential increasing returns to scale. 
In the discussion to follow, we first take up the changes in the pattern of 
trade in goods and services, and the evolution of the terms of trade of 
commodities. We then explore the links between specialization patterns and 
economic performance and conclude with some policy implications, which are 
developed further in the following chapters. 
 
Changing Patterns of Trade 
Over the long term, all countries included in Maddison’s (2001) data set 
had positive growth rates in the value of merchandise exports. As a share of 
GDP, exports generally have increased since the nineteenth century (Figure 4.1). 
This process has been, of course, far from monotonic, with a general reversal 
during the inter-war period of the twentieth century and specific regional 
reversals in other periods. 
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Figure 4.1: Merchandise Exports as Per Cent of GDP by regions. 
Source: Data on exports and GDP are from Maddison (2001). Regions are also defined according 
to Maddison (2001). 
 
The usual long-run conclusion drawn is that there are positive effects of 
trade expansion on overall labor productivity. Over given periods, however, the 
relationship may not be present. For example, in the 1990s greater trade 
openness was not associated with faster economy-wide productivity in most 
countries. As emphasized in Chapter 1, not just openness to trade but a nation’s 
“insertion” into the global economic system (aid and debt relationships, patterns 
of trade, commodity price shifts, and access to technology) strongly conditions its 
prospects.  
Since the 1960s, growth in trade has been accompanied by a gradual 
change in the specialization patterns of developing countries away from primary 
commodities. This process accelerated after the 1980s but was very uneven 
across the developing world (Lall, 2001, ch. 4; Akyüz, 2003, ch. I; Ocampo and 
Vos, 2008, ch. III). Table 4.1 summarizes the patterns of transformation of the 
export structure in the different regions defined in the previous chapter. We use 
the late Sanjaya Lall’s well-known classification of the technological and natural 
resource content of merchandise exports. 
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Period 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006
Primary products 14% 7% 5% 4% 4% 57% 34% 23% 20% 21%
Resource based manufactures 20% 14% 10% 10% 14% 20% 21% 19% 15% 18%
Low-technology manufactures 23% 27% 17% 14% 11% 10% 24% 22% 19% 16%
Medium-technology manufactures 23% 25% 26% 25% 27% 5% 9% 13% 15% 19%
High-technology manufactures 17% 27% 40% 46% 42% 2% 10% 19% 29% 25%
Others 3% 1% 2% 1% 2% 5% 3% 4% 2% 1%
Primary products 56% 19% 10% 7% 4% 30% 20% 18% 13% 12%
Resource based manufactures 15% 11% 11% 9% 8% 21% 19% 19% 21% 32%
Low-technology manufactures 21% 42% 46% 40% 31% 39% 47% 48% 48% 34%
Medium-technology manufactures 6% 21% 18% 20% 22% 6% 9% 10% 10% 15%
High-technology manufactures 1% 6% 14% 23% 34% 2% 3% 4% 5% 5%
Others 0% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 2% 1%
Primary products 44% 43% 29% 24% 30% 66% 67% 63% 55% 51%
Resource based manufactures 25% 20% 19% 16% 16% 27% 24% 21% 22% 29%
Low-technology manufactures 13% 14% 15% 14% 12% 4% 8% 7% 9% 6%
Medium-technology manufactures 14% 18% 26% 27% 25% 2% 1% 2% 3% 3%
High-technology manufactures 3% 3% 9% 16% 11% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1%
Others 1% 1% 1% 3% 5% 1% 0% 6% 10% 11%
Primary products 56% 44% 34% 29% 25% 28% 21% 12% 7% 7%
Resource based manufactures 27% 31% 21% 24% 26% 10% 19% 20% 15% 15%
Low-technology manufactures 8% 12% 15% 16% 18% 17% 23% 31% 26% 20%
Medium-technology manufactures 4% 6% 10% 13% 14% 28% 26% 29% 36% 39%
High-technology manufactures 4% 4% 3% 17% 16% 13% 6% 7% 14% 16%
Others 0% 3% 17% 1% 1% 5% 5% 1% 2% 3%
Primary products 12% 18% 39% 44% 49% 67% 50% 55% 51% 41%
Resource based manufactures 19% 17% 19% 19% 23% 23% 28% 22% 19% 25%
Low-technology manufactures 2% 3% 8% 7% 5% 4% 12% 8% 6% 5%
Medium-technology manufactures 8% 3% 17% 14% 13% 3% 8% 4% 2% 4%
High-technology manufactures 60% 59% 3% 4% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Others - - 15% 11% 8% 1% 2% 11% 20% 24%
Primary products 65% 90% 76% 90% 55% 70% 72% 68% 74% 77%
Resource based manufactures 18% 3% 14% 6% 28% 21% 15% 17% 13% 11%
Low-technology manufactures 5% 2% 4% 1% 2% 5% 6% 8% 6% 4%
Medium-technology manufactures 9% 3% 4% 2% 9% 4% 6% 6% 5% 6%
High-technology manufactures 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Others 1% 1% 1% 1% 5% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1%
Former USSR Representative Africa
Other Africa Middle East
Semi-industrialized Latin 
America, South Africa and 
Turkey







Table 4.1: Shares of commodities with different technological content in total exports 
Source: Source: Authors' calculations based on UN-COMTRADE database. Classifications based 
on Lall (2001).
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The rapidly growing regions in Asia had the most significant shifts in 
technological content – although less so in South Asia than in the other three. As 
noted above, the Tiger economies led in terms of technologically advanced 
exports, which reached 40% or more of total exports since the mid-1990s. Their 
medium technology exports largely maintained their share, whereas the low 
technology and natural resource-based components (both primary goods and 
resource-based manufactures) dropped off sharply.  
Southeast Asia followed a similar but slower pattern of transformation. 
Reflecting its relatively richer endowment, as compared to other Asian regions, 
its resource-based exports held up much more than in the Tigers, and still 
represented close to two-fifths of total exports in the mid-2000s. The region saw, 
in any case, a sharp increase in the export share of mid and high-tech exports, 
which jointly increased from 7% in 1985/86 of total exports of goods to 44% in 
2005/6. Some of these exports, particularly those of high technology, have a 
strong dependence on manufacturing assembly operations, with domestic value-
added in the range of 10-20% of the value of exports.  
Trade patterns also shifted to a significant degree towards manufactures 
and away from primary products in the South Asian countries, largely driven by 
trends in India. These economies remained, however, at the lower end of the 
technological content of exports, although gradually moving up and 
accompanied, in the case of India – though not the neighboring countries — by a 
boom of “dynamic services” (see below). In 2005/6 South Asia was still 
overwhelmingly specialized in exporting resource based or low-tech 
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commodities, which made up about 80% of its export basket of goods. This 
slower transformation also included limited expansion of assembly operations in 
India and Pakistan, which were more important in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. 
Compared to even its successful regional counterparts, the export 
transformation of China was particularly impressive. From a structure not very 
different from that of Southeast Asia in the mid-1980s, it moved to one closer to 
that of the Tigers two decades later. China’s exports of high technology 
manufactures rose from 1% of the total in 1985/6 to 34% in 2005/6, whereas the 
share of mid-technology goods increased from 6 to 22%. Low-tech manufactures 
remained relatively important, however, indeed closer to the patterns of South 
Asia, whereas resource-based exports decreased sharply. Although the 
assembly activities peculiar to late twentieth century globalization constitute an 
important part of its export structure, the Chinese economy has clearly 
compensated for dependence on imported components with a broad industrial 
export dynamism, as reflected in its large manufacturing export surplus. There 
has been a growing deficit in mining (including energy) products, thus generating 
growing linkages with the natural resource based economies in other regions of 
the developing world.1 
The semi-industrialized countries also recorded an increase in the share 
of manufacturing exports, but the speed of this transformation was slow relative 
to that of all the Asian regions. This trend did not offset the region’s historical 
                                                 
1 Data from World Trade Organization Statistics Database show that the mining 
sector gained a significant share in imports, from 5% in 1980 to 13% by 2003, as 
a result of the energy supplies that China obtains abroad, while mining exports 
declined from 27% to 4% respectively for the same period. 
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pattern of specialization as a net importer of manufactured goods and a net 
exporter of agriculture and mining. Reflecting abundant natural endowments, 
46% of the region’s total exports were still resource-based in 2005/6. With some 
important exceptions (Mexico’s incursion into high technology activities with a 
large assembly component), the mid tech manufactures were relatively more 
successful. Some of these industries – such as automobiles and process 
industries — had grown up under import substitution and made a successful 
transformation into export markets. 
The smaller Andean economies remained poorly articulated into the global 
trading system. Table 4.1 shows that around 80% of the region’s exports were 
still made up of primary commodities or natural resource based manufactures in 
the mid 2000s. In contrast, the Central America and the Caribbean economies 
fared better in exporting (largely assembled) manufactured goods as well as 
tourist services (see below). The surge in high technology exports in this group 
has a single explanation: Intel’s production of computer chips in Costa Rica, with 
limited domestic content. More generally, the region remained a net importer of 
manufactures throughout the entire period, indicating that assembly exports did 
not generate the type of dynamic industrial linkages observed in the Asian 
economies undergoing similar transformations. 
 Central and Eastern European exports have been dominated since the 
1980s by manufactures, basically as a consequence of the rapid industrialization 
policies followed after World War II based on the Soviet model and supported by 
the COMECOM. This pattern of specialization implied a chronic deficit of mining 
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and energy products, fitting the energy-intensive nature of Soviet-style 
technologies. As a share in total exports, high tech products in Central and 
Eastern Europe were below that of the Tigers in the mid-1980s and also below 
those of China and Southeast Asia in the mid-2000s. This confirms the 
observation by Podkaminer (2005) that there was a structural mistake made 
during the “planned” years in that not enough attention was paid to specialization 
in high technology sectors. As in the semi-industrialized countries of Latin 
America, Turkey, and South Africa, it was more the mid-technology sectors that 
led the transformation of the export structure. 
Whereas the transition implied for Central and Eastern Europe the 
deepening of the previous industrialization process, for the former USSR it 
implied a veritable “re-primarization” of its export structure. The data in Table 4.1 
apply only to Russia and Ukraine but are representative for the former USSR as 
a whole. The Russian Federation has become primarily an exporter of mining, 
particularly energy related products (oil and natural gas), with the share of 
primary commodities increasing from 12% in 1985/86 to 49% in 2005/6 – or from 
31% to 72% if natural resource based manufactures are included. 
An even higher and stable dependence on exports of natural resources is 
typical of most of the selected Middle Eastern and North African economies. In 
total, about 90% of exports in this region are either primary commodities or 
natural resource based manufactures. It should be underlined that these results 
can be attributed to the large share of Saudi Arabia in region’s total exports. The 
aggregation then overshadows the trade patterns for smaller countries such as 
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Tunisia, Jordan, and Morocco, which now export mostly manufacturing products 
and tourist services.  
Finally, we can look at how sub-Saharan Africa is performing in terms of 
integration into the global trading system. As can be observed in Table 4.1 the 
two sub-regions exported mostly resource-based and low-tech products. The 
larger medium-tech share in Other Africa is driven by Zimbabwe’s exports (as of 
2008 strongly affected by ongoing political turmoil) while the Representative 
Africa region records a slightly higher range of low-tech manufactures.  
 
Trade in Services 
 With new information and communication technologies spreading 
worldwide, the transfer of some service activities across countries and continents 
has become feasible. The internet revolution of the 1990s played a crucial role in 
this regard. An important outcome has been the outsourcing of back-office 
services from developed to developing economies.  
The most publicized case is that of India. An English-speaking, educated 
labor force attracted many multinational corporations which transferred part of 
their operations to take advantage of lower labor costs. An immediate question is 
whether these service activities can contribute, by themselves, to dynamic 
growth in the Hirschmanian sense of establishing linkages with other domestic 
sectors, and/or in the Kaldorian sense of inducing productivity change. More 
directly, in what way do the calling centers outsourced by US firms to Bangalore 
contribute to the establishment of new economic activities, besides those 
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resulting from the final demand by the employed labor? An industrial sector 
would do that through demand for intermediate inputs, raw materials or 
innovations encouraged by industrial policy. Can there be a similar 
developmental strategy based upon the service sector? Indeed, can the Indian IT 
sector advance beyond provision of call centers and back office services to 
production of innovative software? Anecdotal evidence suggests that on the 
whole it has not gone far in this direction. 
Aside from service activities associated with information and 
communications technologies, there has also been a boom of other types of 
services. Tourism, an expanding service activity worldwide, has been dynamic in 
many developing countries. Again, to what extent do these services serve as a 
source of linkages and productivity growth? Banking, insurance and business 
consulting services have also boomed, but have remained highly concentrated in 
industrial countries. 
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Figure 4.2 Share of service sector in total exports 
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2007 
 
Looking at the trends in the overall trade in services is one way to begin to 
address the questions raised above. Figure 4.2 shows that service exports have 
been modest. As a share of total exports of goods and services, the latter 
fluctuate between 9% and 16% for most regions, with China as the lowest. At the 
other end of the scale, South Asia, Central America and the Caribbean, and 
Representative Africa had service exports amounting to between 25% and 36% 
of the total exports.  
Comparing Figure 4.2 with exports of services by type of activities in Table 
4.2 shows that the Central American and Caribbean and the Representative 
Africa regions (mainly Kenya in the latter) had high contributions from tourism, 
which develops some linkages (demand for foodstuffs and some basic 
manufactures) but typically does not lead to significant technological learning. In 
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some cases, when most of the goods used to cater to travelers are imported, not 
even these linkages are present and tourism resembles assembly manufacturing 
in its low contribution to domestic value-added.   
  1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Tigers         
  Transportation 39% 34% 25% 33% 35% 36%
  Travel 25% 30% 36% 27% 22% 18%
  Other Services 36% 37% 39% 40% 43% 46%
Southeast Asia             
  Transportation 16% 14% 14% 9% 17% 22%
  Travel 40% 43% 57% 49% 65% 44%
  Other Services 44% 43% 29% 42% 18% 34%
China         
  Transportation 52% 43% 46% 18% 12% 21%
  Travel 28% 32% 30% 46% 53% 39%
  Other Services 20% 25% 24% 37% 35% 40%
South Asia             
  Transportation 20% 21% 27% 31% 17% 16%
  Travel 45% 25% 27% 29% 19% 16%
  Other Services 36% 54% 46% 40% 64% 69%
Semi-industrialized countries         
  Transportation 27% 32% 22% 22% 19% 20%
  Travel 43% 41% 47% 41% 43% 54%
  Other Services 30% 27% 31% 37% 39% 26%
Andean             
  Transportation 32% 39% 40% 36% 22% 25%
  Travel 39% 30% 31% 36% 50% 53%
  Other Services 28% 31% 28% 28% 27% 21%
Central America and the 
Caribbean         
  Transportation 20% 16% 13% 10% 11% 12%
  Travel 46% 58% 57% 65% 71% 72%
  Other Services 34% 26% 30% 25% 17% 16%
Central and Eastern Europe             
  Transportation 51% 48% 38% 23% 23% 27%
  Travel 20% 21% 22% 35% 49% 38%
  Other Services 29% 30% 40% 42% 29% 35%
Middle East and Northern Africa         
  Transportation 25% na na Na na na 
  Travel 29% na na Na na na 
  Other Services 45% 54% 53% 44% 43% 40%
Representative Africa             
  Transportation 28% 29% na 21% 26% 24%
  Travel 26% 36% na 58% 50% 55%
  Other Services 46% 35% 37% 22% 25% 22%
Other Africa         
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  Transportation 66% 50% 28% 24% 17% 14%
  Travel 10% 10% 8% 8% 9% 6%
  Other Services 24% 39% 64% 68% 75% 80%
Table 4.2: Breakdown of exports of services 
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2007 
11981 as starting year, 2 1982 as starting year, 2003 as end year, 32003 as end year, 4 1982 as 
start year, 2005 without Slovakia, 6 2004 as the last year, 7 1981 as starting year, and 1991 
instead of 1990, 8 2003 as last year, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire and Mozambique. 
 
 
In contrast to these two regions, South Asia (basically India) recorded an 
increase in the share of its services other than travel and transportation. Table 
4.3 adds one more piece of information: the rise of service sector share in 
exports in South Asia is mostly because of expansion of “dynamic” service 
exports associated with information and communications technologies. Such 
exports are dynamic in the sense that they generate high value-added and utilize 
skilled labor as compared to travel and transportation services. Indian experience 
suggests, in particular, that specialization in services with higher value-added 
can help growth and income per capita. Nevertheless, an overwhelming 93% of 
India’s labor force remains unemployed or underemployed in the agricultural and 
urban informal sectors.  
Region 
 
Share in service exports 
Tigers 0.8% 
Southeast Asia 0.6% 
China 2.5% 
South Asia* 39.8% 
Semi-industrialized countries 1.2% 
Andean 0.0% 
Central America and the 
Caribbean** 2.5% 
Central and Eastern Europe 
2.3% 
Middle East and Northern Africa 
0.5% 
Representative Africa 1.0% 
Other Africa* 0.3% 
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*   2003 
** 2004 
Table 4.3:Exports of Information and Communications Services (as a % of total service exports), 
2005 
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2007 
 
Elsewhere, the connection between exports of services and economic 
growth appears to be mixed. The fast growing countries, such as the Tigers and 
China, have consistently seen an expansion of exports in “other services,” mainly 
banking, insurance, and business services. Other services have also been 
increasing and make up 35% of total service exports in Central and Eastern 
Europe, with business related activities taking the dominant share. This is also 
true of some semi-industrialized countries – e.g., Brazil. However, given the low 
share of service exports in general in these economies, it is hard to argue that 
they have played an important role in their growth processes.  
 
Terms of Trade 
Failing to diversify exports toward products with higher domestic value-
added and technological content always carries risks of the adverse terms of 
trade movements that affect primary commodities but increasingly also low-tech 
manufactures, which are associated with low demand elasticities and low wages 
in producing countries.2 Such adverse shocks result, in turn, in declines in export 
                                                 
2 High-tech manufactures experiencing rapid technical change (e.g., computer 
chips) may also experience a fall in the terms of trade, but this is a different 
phenomenon to that experienced by resource based goods and low-tech 
manufactures, where low demand elasticities and cost factors not associated 
with productivity (low wages, in particular) play the leading role. A more similar 
issue to that underscored in the main text is that of mid or high-tech 
manufactures with blueprints that can be easily transferable and become subject 
to integrated production systems (e.g., computer assembly). 
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revenues and potential foreign exchange bottlenecks. Even favorable terms-of-
trade shifts can set off Dutch disease and similar afflictions in primary goods 
exporters. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the economic slowdown in most developing 
countries that started in the second half of the 1970s and deepened during the 
lost decade of the 1980s was partially associated with falling terms of trade for 
non-manufactured products. Terms of trade for commodities fell by around 30% 
from the average of the first three and half decades following the Second World 
War. The collapse lasted about a quarter century. As export values plummeted, 
many economies went into recession or an outright growth collapse. The 
slowdown was worsened by a sudden cut-off in net financial transfers to the 
developing countries at the beginning of 1980s (especially in Latin America).  
The downward trend in prices for primary commodities that began in the 
1970s was not something new. Decades previously, in the late 1940s, two 
structuralist economists, Raúl Prebisch (1950) and Hans Singer (1950), put forth 
a theory on the effects of declining terms of trade for developing economies. 
They maintained that as economies around the world grow richer, the structure of 
their demand changes towards manufacturing products (and now, more recently, 
dynamic services). The use of synthetics to replace raw materials in the 
production manufactured goods will bring about a further decline in the relative 
demand for primary commodities. Terms of trade will thereby move unfavorably, 











































































Figure 4.3: Ratio of aggregate non-oil commodity prices to manufacturing prices 
Source: Grilli and Yang (1998), Ocampo and Parra (2003) and updating using the latter study. 
 
Figure 4.3, updated from Ocampo and Parra (2003), confirms this view. 
The figure presents the long-run trend of real prices for non-fuel primary 
commodities throughout the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.3 
Commodity prices are compared with the manufacturing unit value index 
developed by the United Nations and now regularly updated by the World Bank. 
Thus, the trends describe how prices of primary commodities fared relative to 
manufacturing products for the last century or so. Despite upward spikes early in 
the last century and in the 1920s, 1950s, and 1970s, the overall downward trend 
is quite clear. For the twentieth century as a whole, raw materials recorded a 
decline of more than 50% in their value relative to manufactures. Among different 
                                                 
3 The indices that enter this figure were originally developed by Grilli and Yang 
(1988) for the period 1900-1986. 
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commodities, tropical agricultural products fared the worst, while metals did 
somewhat better (not shown here).  
Another spike emerged in recent years, together with a boom in oil and 
other prices (as in the 1970s). These price hikes were propelled in part by the 
large increase in the demand for raw materials coming from the rapidly growing 
Chinese economy. Many low income primary product exporters (not to mention 
generously endowed Russia and the Persian Gulf countries, among others) saw 
handsome gains in the terms of trade and grew at relatively decent rates. 
Unfortunately, this boom came to end in mid-2008, an event that is likely to 
curtail economic expansion in much of the developing world.  
The solution for ensuring long-term sustainable growth depends on 
developing countries’ ability to diversify their exports towards products with more 
value-added and technological content. While many economies may not be 
ready to enter production of high-tech manufacturing, a niche is open for them in 
other industries where they can still take advantage of increasing returns to scale 
and avoid risks from unfavorable terms of trade shocks or from a decline in the 
world demand for primary products. 
 
Trade Specialization Patterns and Economic Performance 
The evidence of a strong association between the patterns of 
specialization in international trade and economic growth is compelling. 
Hausmann et al. (2007) use cross-country econometrics to argue that the 
“quality” or technological content of exports is a basic determinant of growth. 
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These authors measure quality by the income content of exports, estimated as a 
weighted average of the incomes of countries that typically export the same type 
of goods. Using a different methodology, Ocampo and Parra (2007) and Ocampo 
and Vos (2008, chapter III) come to a similar conclusion. 
Table 4.4 uses the latter approach to show the association. We first 
identify the “dominant” pattern of a specialization – or rather, of the 
transformation of the export structure — of each country in a given period and 
then estimate the average per capita growth rates of countries with that 
specialization pattern. Sanyaja Lall’s classification of exports by technological 
and natural resource contents is again used here. 
We use two alternative methodologies to determine which specialization 
pattern is dominant in a specific country and time period. The first (Panel A) is 
that used by Ocampo and Vos (2008, chapter III). It is based on the change in 
the share of a specific export category weighted by a measure of the “revealed 
comparative advantage” of the country in that category of goods at the end of the 
period (the share of the country in that category of exports in world markets 
relative to its overall share in world exports).4 The second method (Panel B) also 
determines the change in the share of the specific export category multiplied by a 
dummy which indicates whether the country has a “revealed comparative 
                                                 
4 Formally, this index (T) is: T(β, α, k-k+1) = (CSβ,α,k+1 - CSβ,α,k)*(TSβ,α,k+1), where 
CSβ,α,k is the share of  category α  in total merchandise exports of country β in 
period k; and TSα,k+1 is the share of country β’s exports of category α in 
developing countries’ exports of category α in period k+1.  If we divide the 
second term by the country’s share in world exports, we would have the 
commonly used measure of revealed comparative advantage in that category, 
but since this term is common to all categories we exclude it from the equation. 
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advantage” in that category of exports.5 In both cases, the export category with 
the highest value of the estimated coefficient of specialization is taken as the 
“dominant” one during the period6. 
Table 4.4 presents the averages of per capita GDP growth of each group 
of countries with similar “dominant” specialization patterns. Estimates are done 
by decade since the 1970s and two longer sub-periods. According to data 
availability, we include 93 countries in the analysis for 1970-2000 and 67 for 
periods ending on 2005-2006.    
1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2006 1980-2006 1990-2006
High-Tech dominant 5 2.70 1.33 3.15 2.85 3.33 2.59
Medium-tech dominant 4 3.36 -1.36 2.06 3.25 1.22 2.48
Low-tech dominant 3 2.50 0.85 2.06 2.05 1.30 2.04
Natural resources based dominant 2 1.82 -1.05 0.65 2.71 1.13 1.92
Primary commodities dominant 1 -0.36 -0.53 0.59 2.07 0.88 1.45
No dominant pattern 0 0.77 -0.14 0.56 1.11 0.07 -0.40
Number of countries 92 93 80 67 67 67
Number of countries with dominant pattern 89 87 73 58 56 63  
Table 4.4. A: According to the Trade Specialization Indicator (TSI). 1/ 
 
1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2006 1980-2006 1990-2006
High-Tech dominant 5 3.81 3.99 2.80 4.81 3.72 3.70
Medium-tech dominant 4 3.74 -2.33 1.33 3.07 0.61 2.68
Low-tech dominant 3 2.45 1.83 2.07 2.05 1.34 1.98
Natural resources based dominant 2 1.74 -0.84 0.53 2.14 0.81 1.97
Primary commodities dominant 1 -0.39 -0.63 0.04 2.60 0.80 1.54
Highest lost share in 1 2.15 0.10 1.14 0.39 1.10 0.54
Highest lost share in 2 2.29 -0.37 0.16 -0.01 0.50 -0.11
Highest lost share in 3, 4 or 5 2.81 9.31 2.75 3.08
Number of countries 91 92 92 66 66 66
Number of countries with only negative change 26 17 15 12 7 10
Number of countries without data 1 0 0 26 26 26  
Table 4.4. B: According to the Revealed Trade Specialization Indicator (RTSI). 2/ 
Table 4.4: Average per capita GDP growth per group according to alternative indexes of 
dominant pattern of specialization 
                                                 
5 Again, formally, R(β, α, k-k+1) = (CSβ,α,k+1 - CSβ,α,k)*( DRCAβ,α,k+1), where 
DRCAβ,α,k+1  =  1 if RCAβ,α,k+1  > 1 and 0 otherwise. This measure allows the 
identification of cases in which the dominant change in pattern was to move 
away from a sector in which a country had previously reached RCA, even if the 
country had not reached RCA in any new sector. That is shown in Table 4.4 as 
countries with only negative changes in CSβ,α, classified according to the sector in 
which they had the strongest lost in share. 
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Sources: Authors' calculations based on UN. National Accounts Database for per capita GDP and 
UN-COMTRADE Database for trade classifications. See text for definitions and methodology.   
1/ Index T is defined in footnote 4. 
2/ Index R is defined in footnote 5. RCA is the revealed comparative advantage.  
 
These exercises point to three main conclusions. The first is that growth is 
closely associated with the technological and natural resource content of exports. 
Countries with an export pattern dominated by high-tech grow the fastest over 
the long run, followed by exporters of either mid-tech or low-tech products. In 
contrast, exporters of natural resource-based manufactures and, in particular 
primary products consistently show the worst performance. Both methodologies 
confirm this conclusion, with the second accentuating the advantage of high-tech 
exports. 
The second main conclusion is that high-tech and low-tech manufactures 
offer more stable growth patterns, while the other three categories (mid-tech and 
the two natural resource-based categories) are subject to stronger cyclical 
swings, largely associated with fluctuations in commodity prices. Growth in 
countries with these export patterns has been rapid when commodity prices have 
been good (the 1970s and the 2000s) and weak or negative when commodity 
prices have been poor (the 1980s in particular). This association of mid-tech 
exporters with commodity prices no doubt reflects the importance of the process 
industries included in that category, which may be seen as having increasing 
commodity characteristics. 
The specific advantage of low-tech over mid-tech specialization patterns is 
clearly associated with greater stability of growth; during periods of high 
commodity prices mid-tech exporters actually grow faster. On the other hand, the 
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advantage of mid- over low-tech specialization is obviously technological. So, 
there is a trade-off between these two features, with the technological factor 
prevailing in 1990-2006 but not in the 1980-2006 period as a whole. In turn, 
although mid-tech exporters are also cyclically vulnerable, this specialization 
pattern is in the long run clearly superior to that based on natural resources 
(either manufactures or primary goods). 
Finally, as a corollary of the previous patterns, growth tends to be more 
uniform in the developing world during periods of high commodity prices, such as 
the 1970s and the 2000s, though continued specialized in primary goods seems 
to be a disadvantage even in those decades according to most simulations. In 
the more recent period, as we have seen, a major channel has been the linkages 
with commodity exporting developing countries generated by Chinese growth. 
The expectation that a natural resource based specialization pattern will lead to 
fast and uniform growth in the developing world is thus dependent on commodity 




A Primer on the Policy Implications 
 The major policy implications of these empirical findings have already 
been sketched in Chapter 1 and the details are presented in the following 
chapters. 
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 The high points is that sustained per capita income growth is impossible 
without productivity increases in at least some activities producing traded goods. 
As emphasized in Chapter 1, industrial and trade interventions have to be 
designed to support the transformation of the production and trade structures 
and, particularly, to promote production processes subject to increasing returns. 
The international policy environment under the fading Washington Consensus 
and the supervision of the World Bank and the World Trade Organization is less 
favorable to an aggressive policy approach than it was a few decades ago, but 
many possibilities still exist (see Chapters 8 and 9). 
In terms of the shorter term macroeconomic dynamics, the management 
of shocks coming from trade is essential to guarantee stable growth over time 
under all specialization patterns, but particularly in those patterns that are subject 
to strong terms of trade shocks. The crucial links come through the current 
account, which can change dramatically and unexpectedly at any time. In a 
country with a small population, incapable of producing capital and many 
essential intermediate goods, the over-riding macroeconomic restriction during 
crises is “external strangulation”, in the sense of having low hard currency inflows 
from exports and/or capital inflows. Gap models as discussed in Chapter 7 
provide a framework for analyzing the problem but are not a solution. Creating 
new sources of foreign exchange is basically the only way out.  
At the other extreme, ample access to foreign exchange can cause its 
own problems – over-valuation, slow or aborted industrialization, Dutch disease 
and unsustainable economic expansion. The emphasis in this chapter has been 
 22
 23
on impacts of price spikes for raw material exports, but potential problems go 
well beyond those posed by bonanzas. The root of the English “bonanza” is an 
old Spanish word for fair weather, which always comes to an end. 
